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***HİZMET*: A KEYWORD IN THE TURKISH HISTORICAL NARRATIVE**

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In the discourse of the history textbooks used since 1931, the relationship between identity and otherness often tends towards the necessity of proving both the value and greatness of Turkish history and culture. Consequently, the whole historical narrative, and also the discourse on identity and the nationalist discourse, which very often make use of history in their argumentation, always present the Turks in a favorable light and in an emphasized role. This appears in several forms, particularly during a kind of reconstruction of the past using tenses expressing the unreal condition ("If the Turks had not existed... Islam could not have been saved", or "... the European Renaissance could not have taken place", etc.). Another noticeable form is the use of the word *hizmet*, ("service", "utility", "helpfulness", "function") provided by the Turks. The word itself is helpful to fit the Turks in with "otherness", in the way of showing them in a good light in history. With regard to this notion, according to the narrative, wide groups of "others" often take advantage of the existence of the Turks: the whole mankind, the "free world", or the Muslim world, according to the time when the discourse was formulated.

Let us examine a recent example, published by the islamist newspaper *Zaman* (Feb. 13, 1996), in which Ömer Said Gönüllü expresses his admiration for the Mehmetçik (the Turkish Tommy), underlining his bravery and the role played by the Turkish army in protecting different human groups in the recent past: the free world against communism in Korea, the Turkish Cypriots against Greek violence, the Kurds threatened by the Iraqi army in 1991, and the Bosnian against Serbian barbarism in 1995. The help of the Turkish army, he argues, has always been disinterested and has attempted only to be helpful to mankind:

Isn't it true that our soldiers behaved like the heirs of their ancestors, deeming every man they met as they would have considered themselves, embracing him as a godsend on his wide breast?

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Thus, the reason why the Mehmetçik accepts being sacrificed to such causes lies in his Turkish (and Muslim) tolerance and love of mankind,¹ and, finally, in the fact that a Turk is the heir of his ancestors (*atasının torunu*). Using such a *petitio principii*, the author states that a Turk is intrinsically tolerant:

[In Bosnia] he did not repair exclusively mosques, but also churches. Because he is the heir of his ancestors ... And now the existence of Bosnia is consolidated. Thereafter he will serve in his brigade. And he will find the possibility to render services later.

In the same way, I have noticed the presence of the keyword *hizmet* in some of the declarations of Turkish nationalist leaders in Europe. The use of the word is often bound to other stereotypes like the protection of Sunni Islam by the Turks, or the affixing of Islam's seal to Europe:

[Our ancestors] have affixed Islam's seal, Islam's stamp. Joining the procession of those who rendered services [*hizmet*], the Muslims of Switzerland, too, are opening more and more mosques.² Since the time of the Abbassids, the Turkish nation [...] has been the standard-bearer of Islam. [...] The Turkish nation has acquired honor since it has rendered the most services [*hizmet*] to Islam.³

As shown in these examples, *hizmet* is collocated with other keywords: seal (*damga*), standard-bearer (*bayraktar*), honor (*şeref*). My purpose now is to show how the use of these keywords dates back to earlier times, and, above all, how it is largely spread in the society by textbooks.

In Turkish history textbooks, the influence of the first "Turkish turcologists" of the late nineteenth century is noticeable; the main ideas and stereotypes appearing in this first Turkist historiography have been in use to the present day. In a sense, such a continuity is related to the necessity, for Turkish authorities along the twentieth century, to build an apologetic discourse; as Kushner said, "characteristic of all writers who engaged in historical themes was the desire to

1 These ideas are explained in the same page by Ahmet Sürmen, "Sevgi üzerine".

2 Remzi Çelebi, Zürich İslâm Kültür Merkezi, Türkiye, October 21, 1992 (All quotations on Türkiye refer to the edition of Frankfurt, Germany).

3 Mehmet Yüce, Berlin Türk Ocağı, January 17, 1992.

eradicate the ignorance and misconceptions that shrouded, according to them, all phases of Turkish history. Bias against the Turks was shared by a great many Europeans and non-Muslims" (Kushner, 1977, p. 30). At the end of the twentieth century, the same motives prevail, urging the authors — or the institutions — to fashion the historical discourse towards the necessity of justification.

The Use of Hizmet by the First Turkist Historians

As a result, Kushner noticed, for example in the works of Necib Asım, an emphasizing of the role played by the Turks when establishing contacts between different peoples :

If the Turks had not existed, the ideas of Iran, China, of the Arabs, would have never spread beyond their political boundaries.⁴

Other authors quoted by Kushner also use the word *hizmet* to characterize the relations between Turks and the world, including the Muslim world (Şemseddin Sami, 1890-1900, p. 1641). In the same way, as public opinion generally acknowledges that the Arabs fulfilled the guidance of both Islam and Islamic culture throughout the centuries, Turkish authors of that period tried to refute such an idea; thus, their texts are aimed both towards the Western world *and* the Arabs, showing the Turks to advantage, highlighting the *services* they have provided to Islam, in its spread, defence and revival:

Those who waved the Ottoman banner on the Indian seas were not Arabs but Turks... those who bound hundreds of different peoples to the Ottoman sultanate were not Arabs, but Turks. Those who revived justice and virtue, out of the corruption and feuds that characterised the emergence of the Ummayyads, were not Arabs, but Turks (Tevfik 1882; Kushner 1977, p. 32).

Moreover, Bursalı Tahir wrote in 1898 a whole book devoted to the notion of service rendered by the Turks in the field of arts and science, saying:

The Europeans who wrote on Islamic civilization did not pay attention to this point and confused the Turkish scholars with Arab and

⁴ Necib Asım (1900), p. 32; translated by Kushner (1977), p. 31.

Persian scholars. However, it is proved by their genealogy and places of birth that if not half of the great men who served and spread Islamic science and civilization, a third were definitely Turks.⁵

Thereafter, it became a *cliché*, in the historical narrative, to present Central Asian intellectuals like Farabi, and Ibn Sina as *Turkish* intellectuals. It may be that these authors were ethnically Turks - but they thought as Persians and they wrote in Arabic : they were nourished with Persian and Arabic thought. To label them as Turkish intellectuals in order to prove that the Turks enriched Muslim and universal thought is at best anachronistic.

Hizmet and the “History Thesis”

Some intellectual developments took place between the birth of this discourse and the moment when it was made official. It seems that the merit for its clear expression belongs to Ziya Gökalp, and even Tekinalp. The personal and intellectual relations between Gökalp and some figures prominent among the cultural power of the early Republic, like Yusuf Akçura, may explain the presence of the stereotype *hizmet* in the official cultural discourse of around 1930-1931. In a speech delivered at the sixth assembly of the *Türk Ocağı* (April 26, 1930), Yusuf Akçura stated:

The Turkish race has exerted the main influence upon human history, and enabled mankind to progress thanks to its services [*hizmet*].⁶

Soon after the decision was made to create the *Türk Ocakları Türk Tarih Tetkik Heyeti* (Council of the Turkish Hearths for the Investigation of Turkish History; June 4, 1930), preceeding the formation of the *Türk Tarih Tetkik Cemiyeti* (TTTC, Association for the Investigation of Turkish History), which conceived the “history thesis” (*tarih tezleri*). The most conspicuous theme of the famous *Türk Tarihi-nin Ana Hatları* (1931; The Main Lines of Turkish History) is an alleged diffusion of the Turks towards the whole world during the neolithic ages, inferring the idea of a decisive *hizmet* rendered to all of

⁵ Bursalı Tahir (1898), p. 4; Kushner (1977), p. 36. See also Bursalı Tahir (1901).

⁶ Sadri Maksudi, in İğdemir, 1973, p. 75.

mankind. One can find, in this important text, ideas expressed by nineteenth century authors concerning the services rendered by the Turks to Islam:

Thereafter, the Turks provided very great services in the development of both the Muslim religion and Muslim civilization, which is wrongly reputed to be an Arab civilization; they produced the greatest scholars and philosophers of the Muslim world.⁷

Even if, in the history textbooks of 1931, the chapter concerning the Turkish-Islamic culture is only a short account without ideological connotations, the use of the word *hizmet* as related to Islam reveals a continuity between the historiography of the nineteenth century and the Kemalist one; moreover, it seems that today's *Türk-Islam sentezi* (Turkish-Islam synthesis) ideology may find its roots in the *tarih tezleri*. In fact, exactly as in the discourse of the *Türk-Islam sentezi*, in 1931 Islam's history is sometimes used in a nationalist and chauvinistic way. The most conspicuous example may be found in the attempt to turkicize the hero Tarık, conqueror of Spain. Despite the obviousness of the fact that the whole merit of the conquest belonged to the Arabs, in 1931 it was considered necessary to give the Turks their part of the glory:

A man known under the name of Tarık, son of Ziyad, was a Turkish hero.⁸

Even if the word *hizmet* remains here implicit, the idea is quite clear. The authors found it necessary to present the Turkish community not only as the benefactor of mankind, in the framework of an hypothetical prehistorical past, but more precisely as the benefactor of Islam.

Expressed at the beginning of our century, these ideas were transmitted by Ziya Gökalp and the Kemalist historians; then, by the sympathizers of the *Türk-Islam sentezi*. Among them, the main figure was İbrahim Kafesoğlu. As an historian, as an author of history textbooks and as the founder of the "Club of Intellectuals" (*Aydınlar Ocağı*), he was in a position which enabled him to influence the school discourse. We may consider as typical his "Questions about Turkish Nationalism" (*Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Meseleleri*), a collection of articles of nationalist

⁷ *Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları* (Methal Kısım), 1931, p. 69. See also TTTC, 1931, II, pp. 163-165.

⁸ *id.*, pp. 133-134.

inspiration which was accepted for use as a textbook in the Turkish secondary schools. In some of these texts, the relationship between Turks and otherness is dealt with according to the notion of *hizmet*. From a bird-eye's view of the Turkish ancient past, Kafesoğlu evokes the domestication of the horse by the Turks, which enabled them to conquer, then to acquire the sense of State and, consequently, the idea of law. The other instrument of Turkish success allegedly was metallurgy, and thanks to their victories in India, China, the Middle-East and Europe, the populations of these huge areas benefited from the services offered by the Turks: not only the horse and iron, but also intellectual influence on such issues as State organization, language enrichment, philosophy, etc. (Kafesoğlu 1966, pp. 1-8).

In addition, Kafesoğlu was one of the authors who most clearly expressed the ideas of an alleged predisposition of the Turks to Islam, and of a preservation of the Turkish identity within Islam, thanks to their "national culture" (*millî kültür*). Many of his articles dealt with these items, particularly in the entry *Türkler* of the *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, where, concluding a discussion concerning the conversion of the Turks to Islam, Kafesoğlu states: "The Turks very rapidly became the standard-bearers of Islam ..." (1976-9)."

This viewpoint was often promoted by other theoreticians of the *Türk-Islam sentezi*. As an example, Ahmet Arvasi, a columnist of the nationalist newspaper *Türkiye* up to his death in 1988, adopted Kafesoğlu's assertions concerning an old monotheistic religion which would have predestined the Turks for Islam, and the idea of *hizmet* related to Islam:

Yet, the Turks, as they became Muslims, not only rendered services to Islam, but, since they preserved their personality, established the most powerful States in the world (Arvasi 1992, v. 1, pp. 83, 267).

As shown by these examples, the notion of *hizmet* was transmitted all along the twentieth century by the historical-nationalist discourse, and, on its own, is a response to strong accusations formulated by the West at the beginning of the century (Yerasimos 1994).

It is necessary here to be more precise about this notion of response. I use, as Dominique Maingueneau does (Maingueneau 1991, ch. 4), the concept of *deixis instituée* (established deixis) meaning that a discourse remains influenced by the conditions which prevailed

mankind. One can find, in this important text, ideas expressed by nineteenth century authors concerning the services rendered by the Turks to Islam:

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when it was created: at the time when the first Turkist historians quoted above wrote, the very existence of the only State ruled by Turks was threatened; Turkish identity, too, had been seriously denigrated by Greek, Serbian or Armenian nationalisms and almost the whole West. So, the chronography, the established deixis, is inserted in the context of a time of military and cultural assault against the Turks (including the Turks of Central Asia defeated by Russia), in the defeat of Ottoman Empire, and, at last, in the process of the building of a nation-state which followed in 1919-1923. These troubled times, with their violence, wars, deportations, and massacres, are the temporal frame within which the new historical discourse was generated, as a defence, as a self-justifying discourse. Since the official historical discourse, during the Republic (with the exception of the fifties), constantly referred and still refers to the heroic chronography of these times, its established deixis remains unchanged. In this manner, the official discourse has remained a response to the aggressors of that time: the Greeks, Armenians and Arab "traitors", especially since the Greeks and Armenians are still considered enemies. In consequence, the discourse is formed by the existence both of an addressee - the reader, the pupil - and of a superaddressee - the disparagers; moreover, the addressee himself is considered as a co-addressor, insofar as he has, later, to adopt the same discourse against actual or alleged "enemies".

One may consider that the occurrence of key-words like *hizmet* during the whole twentieth century, used in the same contexts with the same purpose, is a good sign of the durability of an established deixis : the historical events of the early twentieth century are still the scene within which official and/or nationalist historiography is inscribed.

It is time, now, to examine how the topic occurs in school discourse during the period following the history thesis.

Hizmet in the Educational Discourse: the Directives

It is useful to examine the directives given by the Ministry of Education to the teachers. These texts provide an ideological frame within which each instructor must teach. Generally, the program first specifies the principles of education ; then the following chapters go into more detail about aims in every subject. In the introductory part of the directives of 1948, the paragraph dealing with history evokes briefly the superiority of the Turkish nation, which, as it founded civi-

lizations “in the whole world”, taught other nations “a happier and easier way of life”. History has to urge pupils to understand the great role of the Turks in history:

With these lessons, the pupil ... has to grasp the great role played by the Turks, in a way to increase his attachment to his own nation and to appreciate which duties the Turkish nation, today and tomorrow, will accomplish towards human society. Especially, the master, teaching the great tasks done by Atatürk at the end of the Empire, then during the Independence War and as he founded the Republic, will enable the pupils to compare, thanks to living examples, these tasks with the end of the Empire; in such a manner, the pupils ... will learn how [the Turkish nation] increased in power and consideration (*itibar*) among the other nations ...; he will better understand, too, how important are the duties incumbent upon him as a citizen of the Republic of Turkey (*İlkokul Programı*, 1948, pp. 3-4).

Among the aims to be reached by the teacher, the following draw attention: “To teach the services rendered by Turkish nation in the elaboration of today’s culture”; “to arouse, among the pupils, curiosity and admiration for the life and services [*hizmet*] rendered by the great men devoted [*hizmet eden*], throughout history, to the nation [*millet*] and mankind”; the instructor, too, has to teach them that “there are duties incumbent upon the Turkish nation, which is a part of the family of nations (p. 124).”

The aim of the directives is first to inform the teacher that his role does not exclusively consist of passing knowledge on to his pupils; the ideology is explicit and prescriptive: “Turkish pupils have to think about the idea of the Turkish revolution and about its place in history; they have to identify themselves with the values of the Revolution”. In addition to items related to the antiquity of the culture, the greatness of the nation, trust in its leaders and in the future, the text underlines the necessity of one’s feeling duty-bound to serve the nation. But what is noteworthy for our topic is the idea of a beneficial influence of the Turks on “each part of the world”.⁹

⁹ In 1945, one still finds the map of the prehistorical migrations which allegedly enabled other nations to progress : Unat-Su, 1945, p. 13. The map first disappeared but then reappeared from 1987 to 1994.

Let us glance at the directives of 1987-1995,¹⁰ within which some of the proclaimed aims of the teaching of history became as follows:

(1) to acquire a general historical education about the great civilizations of history, about the services [*hizmet*] rendered to mankind by nations and statesmen; to give an important place to Turkish history, Turkish culture and Turkish civilization; to understand the importance of the Turkish nation in world history, its place of honor within the family of nations, and its great part in the services [*hizmet*] rendered to mankind and towards the development of world culture and civilization;

(...)

(3) to feel responsible due to being a child of a nation which has created, during the course of history, great civilizations, and is firmly rooted in the past; to trust in the future, since the place of the Turkish nation within the nations of the world is worthy, and to make every effort to follow the way defined by Atatürk's directive: "To bring our national culture up to the level of contemporary culture"; to make constant efforts and, in this aim, to show that one should always be ready to self-sacrifice;

(...)

(7) [the teacher] has to demonstrate that Atatürk and other great Turks were not only national, but universal leaders; he has to teach the duties which are incumbent upon our nation towards mankind, and to awaken in the pupils the feelings of love, respect and devotion [*hizmet*] to mankind."¹¹

There are striking similarities between the texts of 1948 and 1987-1995, showing an ideological continuity. In both documents, the word *hizmet* is given significant importance; since it has been used for decades, it has become an appreciative modality, which betrays how beneficial for mankind the Turkish culture is estimated to have been. This is obvious in 1948, but still more explicit in 1987, since it is specified that the teacher shall praise the services offered by Turkish nation to the world culture and to mankind (first paragraph), while the seventh paragraph reminds that the *duties* incumbent upon "our

¹⁰ 1987 directives were published in *Eğitim*, 3, 1993, pp. 36-37. See also *MEB Ortaokul Programı* 1995, pp. 161-162. In 1995, the first paragraph only slightly differs from the directives of 1987.

¹¹ *ibid.*

nation" are to be fulfilled as an adhesion to a humanist ideal based upon love and devotion. Of course, the best example of this attitude may be found in the active engagement in the Korean war, in which, given the distance, Turkey had no interest but simply did its part in the fight against communism. Turkey, still today, can boast of unselfish and disinterested service offered to the larger community.

It is very useful to examine some of the words of the official directives, since they betray which kind of relation to the world the authorities intended to foster in the minds of the Turkish population. The Turks are mostly indicated as the Turkish nation, *Türk ulusu* or *Türk milleti* (exceptionally *yurt* or *toplum*). This group is inserted in a whole, called *dünya* (the world), *milletler ailesi* (the family of nations), *başka milletler* (the other nations), or, sometimes, *insanlık* (mankind).

Let us pay attention to the words used to name the relationship itself: most frequently, they refer to the services as *hizmet* or with other words evoking the idea of the Turks acting in world history: *rol* (the role), *pay* (the part, the contribution), *işler* (the tasks), and, *role* and *contribution* are qualified as "great", "important", "honorable" (*büyük, önemli, şerefli*). In such a way are formed some appreciative modalities which, joined with some important presuppositions,¹² dispose of every debate on the actual importance and positive features of the role played by the Turks in history.

This kind of relationship with the world appears very clearly. Nevertheless, one may perceive other types of relations with the totality of the world. First, there is a tendency, rooted in the "history thesis" and earlier trends, trying to keep alive the idea of a worldwide spread of Turkish culture. According to this point of view, the Turks almost are the world : "...advanced civilizations founded by the Turkish nation in four corners of the world" (1948). This trend, however, became blurred between 1987-1995.

Another type of relation with the world also appears in the directives of 1948; here the direction of the relation is opposite, *from the world towards the Turks*, expressing the search for consideration (*itibar*) and betraying the expectation of both acknowledgement and recognition for provided services. It is asserted that the role of the

¹² Among these is the presupposition inferring that everything or everyone coming from inner Asia is Turkish.

Turks was at last recognized by the West thanks to “the Great Leader”: Mustafa Kemal is seen as the medium who enabled a better relationship with the world, and who brought about the acknowledgment of the world. This, perhaps, is an important factor in the attachment to Atatürk.

The great difference between the notions of *hizmet* and *ödev*, service and duty, respectively, is noteworthy. Both deal with the act of offering one’s capacities, competencies, strength or force. But, while *hizmet* is a service provided of one’s own free will, *ödev* is an obligation from which one cannot escape. Moreover, *ödev* may end up in sacrifice and death for the community, in other words, in martyrdom (*şehitlik*). In both cases, *hizmet* and *ödev* entail an obligation for those who benefit from the service or the duty. In the case of *hizmet*, a larger human group is indebted to the smaller, Turkish nation; in the case of *ödev*, the individual or the community led to sacrifice gets, in principle, the right to be recognized as a full member of the group, in other words, as a citizen. This idea is sometimes asserted by some Turkic ethnic minorities in today’s Turkey (“as we gave martyrs at Çanakkale, in Korea, in Cyprus, we feel we are citizens of this Republic”). Conversely, in the Ottoman Empire, since the right to serve the nation as soldiers (*ödev*) was denied to non-Muslim minorities, they could not avail themselves of any sacrifice to state their attachment to the Empire, and thus their discourse was - and perhaps remains - often built upon the notion of *hizmet* in the fields of science, art, literature, etc. (for example see Galante 1928, pp. 127 sq., 1932, pp. 96sq). When a group is able to invoke a sacrifice for the nation, the lack of acknowledgement by the state creates a deep resentment, as was the case of Maghrebians and Africans, who gave martyrs for France and were not recognized as citizens after both World Wars.

To sum up, it may be stated that providing a service entails, as a rule, the creation of a link between an indebted individual or group and those who provided their service. The latter do expect gratitude, and are embittered if none is expressed; thus, services allegedly provided throughout the ages to mankind, and to free world, have not ended up with any actual acknowledgement, as shown in 1919 and in the case of an hypothetical entry into European Community. This could explain some of the reaction among the nationalist groups in Turkey.

Finally, it is important to observe that, in the texts of the

directives, the beneficiary of the services is always mankind, and *never Islam*. In this matter, there is a contradiction with the *lessons* themselves, in which the discourse conversely refers much more often to the services rendered to Islam. The existing difference between the directives and the textbooks may be used to distinguish an official state discourse from the textbooks' discourse itself, circulating a controlled narrative, but more and more open to non-Kemalist themes.

In the Narrative of the Textbooks: Hizmet and Islam

In the last forty years, official textbooks have tried to emphasize the role played by the Turks in the spread of Islam and in the development of its culture from the time of their conversion in the ninth century to the time of their effective leadership of Islam in the sixteenth century. This is an opportunity to use the notion of *hizmet*. Usually, in the lessons, at significant moments of history, the narrative is interrupted and some considerations are introduced, referring to the present, in such a way that the evocation of the long-term consequences of the event underlines its own importance. In such a manner is presented the entry of the Turks into Islam's history. The interruption refers both to a previous past and to present: on the one hand, the ancient past of the Turks is recalled, as the author evokes their alleged predisposition to Islam; on the other hand, as we will see later, an evocation of the present depicts a non-Arab Islam, the spread and culture of which was a Turkish task.

Lessons extolling the Turks' merits in Islam's history began to appear around 1955. Emin Oktay, in his textbook for high schools, presented this question evoking what is essentially an historical myth, the loss of Andalusia by Islam, presenting, in an implicit opposition, the Arabs, who failed in their task, and the Turks, who, conversely, saved Islam from the Crusaders:

Had the Crusaders not been stopped by the Turks, they would have defeated Islam and thrown it back to Arabia, just as occurred in Andalusia (Oktay 1955, p. 90).

Even if the word *hizmet* does not appear here, the idea is introduced into the discourse: henceforth, the Turkish nation is precisely inserted into a Muslim whole rather than into mankind. But the role of the Turks as saviors of Islam is overemphasized only between

1985-1990. Yüksel Turhal strongly insisted on this matter, although Kemalist ideas simultaneously — and paradoxically — pervade his book. At the end of the chapter dealing with the Turks' conversion to Islam, he underlines the role they played thereafter: they protected Islam, as it was in collapse, against Shi'ism and the Crusades, and then against Europe, until the twentieth century; they deeply influenced the history of India, Central Asia, Northern Africa and Eastern Europe during a millennium; finally by the monuments and works they created, they contributed to the overall progress of civilization (Turhal 1989, pp. 9-10; also Sümer et al, 1992, p. 176). Whereas the *universal mission* of the Turks does appear as a main feature in the directives, in this example, the mission towards *Islam* is underlined; the author only suggests that Turkish culture acquired a universal aspect and that Muslim culture is portrayed as a vehicle of Turkish genius.

The same ideas are diversely emphasized but almost always exist in the textbooks published between 1986 and 1993. Generally the narrative of the ninth-century conversion to Islam is broken off by an anticipation referring to later ages: the Turkish-Muslim sultanates of the Middle-Ages and even, as in the preceding example, contemporary ages. The role of the defence against the Crusaders is a recurrent item, at least since the late nineteenth century (Midhat 1887; Kushner 1977, pp. 139-140), but the perspective is sometimes enlarged to include the idea of Muslim civilization proper:

So, Muslim civilization, assimilating the characters of the Seljukids, and thanks to the perfection of their government, to their social and cultural institutions, to the peace and safety they ensured, came to a new life and reached a new power, just as it was threatened with extinction.

To conclude, the Turks have been the standard-bearer of Islam during ten centuries; they have conquered new countries for it; they have enabled Islam to take root in a huge domain from India to the Balkan peninsula (Köymen et al, 1990, p. 10).

One may observe here a shifting between two designations: "the Seljukids" become "the Turks"; simultaneously, their sphere of activity becomes wider. But all kinds of utterance, in this matter, are based upon the presupposition that the Arabs were not able to keep Islam alive, while the Turks caused not only a rebirth (*canlanma*) but also a new surge which made Islam a universal religion.

However, whereas this universality is sometimes expressed, some textbooks very clearly establish a dual Muslim world: not an ideological duality between sunnism and shiism, but a geographic and cultural one, between Turkish Islam and the other, not designated, Arab Islam. Geographical toponym in some utterances (as in the textbook of Turhal) do delimit the field of a non-Arab Islam which could acquire, in the mind of Turkish pupils, a special sentimental value, since this field was islamicized "by [their] ancestors."

One of the key-events of this process, in the views of Turkish official history, is the battle of Malazgirt (1071), the religious interpretation of which acquired its full expression between 1976 and 1988 ; up to 1993, at least, all textbooks insist upon the beneficial role of the event in the destiny of Islam. According to Claude Cahen and most Turkish medievalists, the Abbasid khalif incited the Muslim world to pray for the victory of the Seljukid sultan Alparslan each Friday at noon prayer. According to classical sources, this was what decided Alparslan to take up the fight against the Byzantine army on Friday 26 August 1071, just after the noon prayer.¹³ In this perspective, the event is seen not merely as the military victory of a sultan, but as the victory of Islam over Christendom.

This interpretation is often evoked, as a way to give religious significance to the narrative, and, also to reintroduce the idea of distinguished service provided by the Turks to Islam, in such a way that the consequences of Malazgirt's victory concern not only Anatolian, Middle-Eastern and Balkan history, but also world history, since the Turkicization of Anatolia involved the Crusades and then set off a chain of consequences, like the growth of trade between eastern and western Mediterranean, opening new horizons for Europe.¹⁴

The Way of Success : Turkish Identity

Throughout the centuries, the Turks have been confronted by other nations and even governed them. Nevertheless, from the eleventh century onwards and after a long peregrination, they succeeded in forming a Turkish society in Anatolia. In such a case, the preservation of identity is, indeed, surprising. According to the text-

13 Cf O. Turan, 1965; Kafesoğlu-Deliorman, 1976, p. 70; Turhal, 1989, p. 81; Uğurlu-Balci, 1989, pp. 76 and 82-84.

14 Turhal, 1989, p. 82; Uğurlu-Balci, 1989, p. 78; Akşit, 1987, p. 93.

books, the explanation lies in the strength and vigor of Turkish culture, language, traditions and institutions transmitted and finally put at Islam's disposal. Consequently, this first historical Turkish-Islamic synthesis was not a dilution of Turkish identity among other cultures; the new Turkish-Islamic culture, even if it was different from the old steppe culture, remained, as alleged in the textbooks, inherently Turkish:

The Turks, as they came from a steppe culture to Muslim culture, adapted themselves to those new conditions, but did not lose their national identity.

The essence [of Turkish culture] was always protected. Essentially because they were Turks, they ensured, until today, its existence with its whole beauty. ... At least, a new Turkish-Muslim society was created, differing both from the old [steppe culture] and from the Arab and Persian societies.¹⁵

This brief examination of the keyword *hizmet* should be completed by a deeper investigation, not only into the historical discourse, but also into the political one and into those of the newspapers. Nonetheless, it is possible to draw some conclusions from the analysis presented here.

We have here examples of a discourse built upon a notion of totality; simultaneously, it contributes to build this totality: it deals first with a *temporal whole* (with the notion of an unchanging Turkish identity, throughout the millennia, since the citizens of the Republic of Turkey are seen as the heirs to this eternal identity) and, overall, a *spatial whole*, as the discourse tries to insert the Turkish community within the larger world. Such a process, particularly in its spatial dimension, is a perennial one in every educational system, since it aims to provide to pupils some landmarks which enable them to place themselves among their fellow creatures and among "the family of nations".

Nevertheless, the Turkish discourse is probably original since, using the concept of *hizmet*, it nourishes a national pride as an implicit response to Western disparagement. This expectation of

¹⁵ Şahin, 1992, p. 175; Sümer et al., 1992, p. 195 (or Turhal, 1989, p. 44). See also Kafesoğlu-Deliorman, 1976, p. 173.

acknow-ledge-ment and recognition, if disappointed, may lead to deep resentment.

In conclusion, the most important feature of the use of *hizmet* in the last thirty years, seems to be the process of transferring the idea of *hizmet* from the whole world to the Muslim world. This process is firmly built upon the narrative concerning the Middle Ages, the period of conversion to Islam, the first Turkish-Muslim sultanates, and the victory at Malazgirt. Although it existed earlier in the national-historical discourse, it is a relatively new element in the educational one. The notion of *hizmet* became a paradigm of the historical narrative around 1990. This illustrates a clear dichotomy between the official state discourse (the directives) and that of the textbooks, which, although in accordance with the former, exploits its omissions and silences, forming finally a divergent discourse, influenced by the *Türk-Islam Sentezi*.

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